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Free Will as Attractor Autonomy: A Dynamical Account of Agency
Author: Robert Galida https://fantasyattractor.com/
Date: May 2026
Abstract
Free will is often seen as either a magical mystery (libertarianism) or an illusion (hard determinism).
This paper offers a third view using the attractor framework.
In this framework, your mind is a dissipative, self‑referential attractor of your whole body.
Free will is redefined as attractor autonomy:
- The ability to generate behaviour from your own internal dynamics.
- To keep yourself stable over time.
- To model yourself.
- And to reshape your own attractor landscape over time.
Agency comes in degrees – it is not a simple yes/no.
We give a mathematical formula for an agency index A that combines three factors:
- Attractor dimensionality D (complexity of your brain’s activity)
- Recursive self‑modification R (your ability to change your own habits)
- Self‑reference strength S (how well you have a persistent self‑model)
The paper makes a falsifiable prediction: an inverted‑U relationship between attractor dimensionality and sense of agency – too low or too high reduces agency.
We describe how to test this with EEG, intentional binding tasks, and statistical methods. We also engage with classic compatibilist philosophers (Frankfurt, Dennett) and address Pereboom’s manipulation argument.
We even provide an explicit rule to avoid the “liver problem” (a false positive for self‑reference).
1. Introduction
The attractor framework says that persistence under disturbance is the basic mark of reality.
Minds are dissipative attractors – patterns that need constant energy flow, integrating the whole body.
In this view, free will cannot be a supernatural break from cause and effect. Instead, it must be a dynamical property of certain attractors.
We do not claim to solve the ancient free will debate. We offer a naturalistic, testable redefinition that adds new empirical content to compatibilism.
2. What Free Will Is Not – And What It Is
2.1 Rejecting supernatural libertarianism
Libertarian free will requires an uncaused choice – a break in the chain of cause and effect.
The attractor framework rejects this: there is no evidence for it, and it contradicts physical laws.
2.2 The error of hard determinism
Hard determinism says freedom is an illusion because everything is determined. But it confuses “determined” with “externally coerced”.
A system can be internally determined – by its own attractor – yet still be free. That is the core of compatibilism.
2.3 Free will as attractor autonomy
We define free will (or agency) as the degree to which a system has four properties:
- Dissipative persistence – it stays alive by using energy and exporting waste (measured by energy use and recovery speed).
- Self‑reference – it has an internal subsystem (an “indexical locus”) that models the whole system and is stable.
- Trajectory selection – it can choose among different possible futures (measured by policy entropy H(π)).
- Recursive self‑engineering – it can change its own attractor shape (measured by learning‑to‑learn or metacognitive accuracy).
These four are jointly necessary. If any is missing, agency is at best primitive.
Because they are necessary, we combine them with a multiplicative formula (if any factor is zero, agency is zero).A=(Dmax−DminD−Dmin)α(RmaxR)β(Smax−SminS−Smin)γ
Where:
- D = attractor dimensionality (e.g., from EEG)
- R = recursive modification capacity (e.g., improvement in a meta‑learning task)
- S = self‑reference strength (normalised mutual information)
The constants (Dmin,Dmax, etc.) are set from a reference population.
The exponents α,β,γ are estimated from data (e.g., comparing healthy people with patients).
A threshold Acrit (e.g., the 5th percentile of healthy humans) decides where agency begins.
Agency is graded:
- Rock: A≈0
- Thermostat: A≈0
- Worm: A≈0.1 (some learning, little self‑model)
- Human: A≈0.8
3. The Indexical Locus: Defining the “Self” and Avoiding the “Liver Problem”
The indexical locus L is the part of the system that acts as a persistent self‑model.
To avoid trivial cases (like a liver having high mutual information with the rest of the body), we add three extra conditions:
- Top‑down causal influence – L can change the rest of the body in ways that serve the body’s goals (measured by variance explained beyond bottom‑up effects).
- Informational closure – L’s own dynamics are relatively independent of the rest over short timescales (conditional mutual information > 0).
- Self‑referential loop – L influences the body, and the body influences L back (bidirectional Granger causality).
These criteria rule out livers, pacemakers, and simple homeostats. The indexical locus is a recursive self‑model, not just a predictive subsystem.
4. Active Inference and Policy Entropy
In active inference (Friston), agents try to minimise “free energy” – they pick policies (sequences of actions).
Each policy is a trajectory through the agent’s attractor landscape.
Policy entropy H(π)=−∑p(π)logp(π) measures how many different policies are available.
- Low entropy → rigid, one‑track mind.
- High entropy → flexible, but possibly noisy.
Free will is the ability to access many low‑energy policies. The agent’s choices are not random; they are constrained by the attractor geometry. But if several attractor basins are open, the agent can choose among them – that is what we feel as free choice.
Policy entropy can be measured in behavioural tasks where multiple choices are equally good (e.g., probabilistic reversal learning, two‑armed bandit tasks).
5. The Inverted‑U Prediction and Falsification
5.1 Core prediction
We predict an inverted‑U relationship between attractor dimensionality D and the subjective sense of agency (e.g., from intentional binding experiments).
- Very low D → chaotic, unstable (like schizophrenia) → low agency.
- Very high D → rigid, stuck (like OCD) → low agency.
- In the middle → flexible but stable → high agency.
The agency index A also includes R and S, which we think increase agency across the board. So to test the inverted‑U for D alone, you need to control for R and S (e.g., study people matched on those, or use partial correlation).
5.2 How to measure and test
- Attractor dimensionality DD – use the Grassberger‑Procaccia algorithm on 5‑min resting‑state EEG/MEG.
- Sense of agency – use the intentional binding paradigm: press a key, then a tone sounds; participants estimate the time between action and tone. Stronger binding means higher agency.
- Statistical test – fit a quadratic regression: agency = β0+β1D+β2D2.
If β2<0 and the vertex lies inside the observed range of D, the inverted‑U is supported. Use bootstrap (1000 resamples) to check confidence intervals.
5.3 Falsification condition
The framework is falsified if:
- The quadratic coefficient β2 is not negative (no inverted‑U).
- Or, in a clinical experiment (e.g., increasing D in OCD patients with NMDA drugs), agency does not decrease but keeps increasing.
6. Experimental Proxies – Summary Table
| Construct | Measure | How to record | Expected relation to agency |
|---|---|---|---|
| Attractor dimensionality D | Correlation dimension (Grassberger‑Procaccia) | Resting‑state EEG/MEG (5 min) | Inverted‑U |
| Policy entropy H(π) | Entropy of choice distribution | Probabilistic reversal learning (200 trials) | Inverted‑U |
| Sense of agency | Intentional binding magnitude | Action‑outcome interval compression (50 trials) | Max at intermediate D |
| Recursive self‑modification R | Learning‑to‑learn improvement | Meta‑learning task (pre‑post difference) | Positive (more is better) |
| Self‑reference strength S | Normalised mutual info In(L;S) | Resting‑state fMRI or MEG | Threshold > θ |
7. Hierarchical Constraints and Social Attractors
Free will is nested inside larger attractors – society, culture, laws, economy. Your range of choices is partly set by these.
This is not an objection; it is just the fact that freedom is always constrained autonomy.
We predict that societies with more cultural diversity (higher “cultural entropy”) allow more individual agency, other things being equal. This can be tested by cross‑cultural comparisons of policy entropy in decision tasks.
8. Engagement with Compatibilist Literature
8.1 Standard compatibilists (Frankfurt, Dennett)
- Frankfurt (1971): freedom is about your will aligning with your own desires. Our framework adds that those desires must be encoded in a persistent self‑referential attractor. The recursive self‑engineering component R maps directly to Frankfurt’s “second‑order volitions”.
- Dennett (1984): freedom is about being able to respond to reasons. Our framework adds that this requires a certain basin geometry and recursive plasticity.
8.2 Addressing Pereboom’s manipulation argument
Pereboom argues: if a neuroscientist engineers your brain, you are not free – even if your behaviour comes from internal dynamics.
Our reply: agency requires recursive self‑modification (R>0) at some point in your history.
- A perfectly manipulated agent that never changed its own attractor would have R≈0 and thus A≈0.
- A healthy human who learned and adapted has R>0 and genuine agency.
The origin of the initial attractor does not matter – only the presence of self‑modification over time.
9. Open Questions and Limitations
- Calibrating exponents – α,β,γ and the threshold θ need to be estimated from large‑scale data (e.g., Human Connectome Project) using maximum likelihood.
- The liver problem – our exclusion criteria need empirical validation; we must show that organs like the liver do not satisfy them.
- Inverted‑U for policy entropy – the same shape is predicted but may be hidden by decision noise.
- Moral responsibility – the framework gives a basis for responsibility (if A>Acrit), but it does not settle all normative questions – it only gives a scientific starting point.
10. Conclusion
Free will is not a supernatural escape from physics. It is a dynamical property of certain dissipative, self‑referential attractors:
- The ability to act from your own internal dynamics.
- To keep a stable self‑model over time.
- And to reshape your own attractor landscape.
This account is compatibilist, testable, and graded.
The inverted‑U prediction, with a specified statistical test, gives a clear falsification criterion.
The dance of free will is the dance of a self that persists under perturbation.
Suggested citation: Galida, R. S. (2026). Free Will as Attractor Autonomy: A Dynamical Account of Agency in the Attractor Framework (Reader‑Friendly Version). Fantasy Attractor.
The Persistence Functional: A Mathematical Measure of Attractor Resilience
Author: Robert Galida
Date: May 2026
Abstract
The attractor framework says that persistence under disturbance is the basic mark of reality.
To turn this idea into a formal science, we introduce the persistence functional P(x).
P(x) is a single number that measures:
- How deep a state is inside an attractor basin.
- How quickly it returns after a knock.
We define P(x) for three different kinds of systems:
- Deterministic dissipative systems – here P is linked to Lyapunov exponents and basin stability.
- Stochastic systems – here P is linked to escape time and quasipotential.
- Information‑theoretic systems – here P is linked to negative free energy or mutual information.
The recovery rate −P˙/P is a universal sign of critical slowing down – a warning that a system is about to tip.
We also discuss limitations: resilience may depend on direction (“anisotropic”), and multiple timescales may need vector or tensor persistence. We list open mathematical problems.
This paper is a roadmap, not a finished theory.
1. Introduction
In the attractor framework, persistence under disturbance is central. But we have not had a single number to say how persistent a state is.
The persistence functional P(x) aims to fill that gap.
What P(x) should do:
- P(x)>0 for states inside an attractor basin.
- For a conservative attractor (like a free electron), P is maximal (normalised to 1).
- For a dissipative attractor, P drops after a disturbance and then recovers.
The recovery rate −P˙/P equals:- the negative of the largest Lyapunov exponent (for deterministic systems)
- the inverse return time (for stochastic systems)
- the rate of information loss (for informational systems)
- P falls as the system approaches a bifurcation, giving early warning.
We do not give one universal formula. Instead, we give a family of definitions, each suited to a different type of system, all united by the same purpose – measuring resilience.
2. Deterministic Dissipative Systems
Consider a smooth system x˙=f(x) with a stable attractor A and its basin B(A).
A natural candidate for P(x) uses a Lyapunov function V(x) – a kind of energy that always decreases inside the basin (V˙<0).
We define:P(x)=1−Vmax−VAV(x)−VA
This gives P=1 on the attractor and P→0 at the basin boundary.
Near the attractor, the recovery rate is related to the largest Lyapunov exponent λ1:−P˙/P≈−λ1
When the system approaches a tipping point, λ1→0−, so the recovery rate slows down – this is critical slowing down.
Conclusion: For deterministic systems, P can be built from a Lyapunov function. The recovery rate equals the negative of the largest Lyapunov exponent.
3. Stochastic Systems
When noise is present, persistence is about how long it takes to escape from the basin.
The mean first passage time τ(x) – the average time to leave – is a natural measure.
We define:P(x)=τmaxτ(x)
where τmax is the value at the attractor.
For weak noise, τ(x) grows exponentially with the quasipotential U(x) (Freidlin–Wentzell theory):τ(x)∼eU(x)/ϵ
So:P(x)∝e−(Umax−U(x))/ϵ
The recovery rate is the inverse of the return time. As a tipping point is approached, the return time diverges, and the recovery rate goes to zero. This again gives critical slowing down – rising variance and autocorrelation.
Conclusion: For stochastic systems, P is proportional to the mean exit time (or the exponential of the quasipotential). This connects persistence to large deviation theory.
4. Information‑Theoretic Systems
For systems where information matters (neural, cognitive, social), we can define persistence using mutual information between past and future.
Let Ipast,future be the predictive information. Then:P(t)=I(past;future at time t)orP=e−surprisal
The decay of P(t) over time measures memory loss.
Landauer’s principle connects information loss to entropy production:P˙/P≤−kBln2S˙
Alternatively, in the free energy principle (Friston), the negative free energy −F acts like a Lyapunov function. We can set:P=e−F/kTorP=−F
Then −P˙/P is the rate of free energy minimisation, which slows near bifurcations.
Conclusion: For information‑theoretic systems, P can be defined via mutual information decay or negative free energy, linking persistence to entropy production and predictive coding.
5. Unifying Recovery Rate and Critical Slowing Down
Across all types of systems, the recovery rate λrec=−P˙/P (just after a small disturbance) is a universal indicator:
- Deterministic dissipative: λrec=∣λ1∣ (absolute value of the largest Lyapunov exponent)
- Stochastic: λrec = inverse of the return time, related to the quasipotential’s curvature
- Information‑theoretic: λrec = rate of free energy minimisation or information loss
As the system approaches a bifurcation, λrec→0. This is critical slowing down.
It shows up as rising lag‑1 autocorrelation and variance (Scheffer et al., 2009).
So P and its recovery rate give early warnings.
6. Normalisation for Conservative Attractors
For a perfect conservative attractor (e.g., an electron in its ground state, no decay), the persistence functional should be constant and maximal:Pcons=1for all times
No recovery rate is defined (or it is zero). This anchors the scale.
For emergent approximate conservative systems (like atomic clocks), P is very close to 1 and decays extremely slowly.
7. Limitations – Scalar Collapse and Anisotropic Resilience
A single scalar P(x) may not be enough for systems where resilience is anisotropic – that is, recovery speed depends on the direction of the perturbation.
High‑dimensional systems can have multiple timescales (fast and slow modes). A scalar average can miss important structure.
Future work may need:
- Vector persistence – a list of recovery rates along different directions.
- Tensor persistence – a metric that captures the full shape of the basin.
- Persistence manifold – the geometry of the basin in state space.
We accept this limitation. The scalar P is a useful first approximation for systems with isotropic resilience or for early‑warning applications where a single number is enough. For complex systems, a multidimensional generalisation is an open research problem.
8. Open Mathematical Problems
- Derive P(x)P(x) from first principles for a given class of systems (e.g., from a variational principle).
- Prove that −P˙/P=∣λ1∣−P˙/P=∣λ1∣ for a wide class of dissipative systems.
- Extend the definition to systems with multiple attractors and chaotic basins (where basin stability is fractal).
- Establish a rigorous relationship between PP and the mutual information decay rate for non‑equilibrium processes.
- Formulate a universal persistence functional that works across all regimes – or prove it’s impossible.
- Test the predictive power of PP in controlled experiments (e.g., ecological microcosms, neural cultures, social media sentiment).
- Develop vector/tensor persistence for anisotropic resilience.
9. Conclusion
The persistence functional P(x) gives a mathematical language for attractor resilience.
We have given operational definitions for three regimes:
- Deterministic dissipative → Lyapunov / basin stability
- Stochastic → escape time / quasipotential
- Information‑theoretic → mutual information / free energy
The recovery rate −P˙/P unifies critical slowing down across all these domains.
We have explicitly noted limitations (scalar collapse, anisotropy) as open problems.
This paper is a roadmap, not a final theory. The framework now has a quantitative step.
Suggested citation: Galida, R. S. (2026). The Persistence Functional: Towards a Mathematical Measure of Attractor Resilience (Reader‑Friendly Version). Fantasy Attractor.

