

# Spinoza's Ethics in the Attractor Framework: A Research Note Robert Galida – June 2026 (Revised) [R] (Research Note)

## Abstract

Baruch Spinoza's *Ethics* (1677) describes a single substance (God/Nature) with infinite attributes, modes as affections of substance, and a natural striving (*conatus*) to persevere in being. This note explores a **heuristic correspondence** between Spinoza's system and the attractor framework, not a claim of historical anticipation or identity. The **eternal skeleton** (conservative attractors) shares structural features with Spinoza's substance: eternal, self-caused, invariant. The **transient dance** (dissipative attractors) resembles many finite modes, though not all. Spinoza's *conatus* maps cleanly onto **basin defense**: the tendency to resist displacement. **Inadequate ideas** can stabilize into **fantasy attractors** (sealed belief systems with low corrective permeability  $\kappa$ ) when they form self-reinforcing networks. **Adequate ideas** function analogously to increased  $\kappa$ , allowing the mind to escape error. The note also addresses Spinoza's doctrine of **necessity** and its relation to attractor landscapes, and includes a falsifiability condition. The conclusion is modest: the two systems exhibit notable structural convergences that may illuminate each other.

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# 1. Introduction

Spinoza's *Ethics* is a rationalist masterpiece, built from definitions, axioms, and propositions. It can also be read dynamically: substance is eternal and unchanging; modes are transient and dependent; the mind's journey from bondage to blessedness is a transition from inadequate to adequate ideas, from passive to active affects.

The attractor framework offers a different but parallel vocabulary: **eternal skeleton** (conservative attractors), **transient dance** (dissipative attractors), **basin depth**, **corrective permeability ( $\kappa$ )**, and **fantasy attractors** (sealed belief systems). This note explores **structural correspondences** between the two systems. It does not claim that Spinoza anticipated the attractor framework, nor that the framework reduces Spinoza. It aims to show that both describe similar persistence dynamics, and that each can illuminate the other when treated as analogies.

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## 2. Substance and the Eternal Skeleton

Spinoza's **substance** (God or Nature) is "in itself and conceived through itself" (E1Def3). It is eternal, uncaused, has infinite attributes, and does not change. It simply **persists**.

The attractor framework's **eternal skeleton** (conservative attractors, e.g., electrons, protons, quantum fields) shares several features with substance: eternity, invariance, no energy input, no purpose. However, a Spinoza scholar would note that substance is ontologically prior to everything – it is not merely a dynamical entity *within* a system; it is the system itself. In the attractor framework, conservative attractors are parts of reality, not the ground of all

reality.

**Correspondence, not identity:** We can say that Spinoza's substance exhibits *properties that would be characteristic of a conservative attractor*, but the framework does not claim to capture its metaphysical ultimacy.

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### 3. Modes and the Transient Dance

Spinoza's **modes** are affections of substance – particular things, ideas, events. They are finite, dependent, and temporary. Many of them (e.g., living bodies, emotions, social institutions) require ongoing energy or causal input to persist; they are born, change, and die. These can be modeled as **dissipative attractors**.

However, not every mode fits that description. A mathematical truth, a triangle, or a relation (e.g., “ $2+2=4$ ”) does not obviously require energy throughput. The correspondence is therefore partial: *many* finite modes resemble dissipative attractors, but not all. The note restricts its claim accordingly.

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### 4. Conatus as Basin Defense

This is the strongest mapping. Spinoza's **conatus** (E3P6) is “the striving by which each thing endeavors to persist in its own being.” It is the intrinsic tendency to resist destruction and maintain state.

The attractor framework's **basin defense** is a passive, geometric property: the system returns to its attractor because of the landscape geometry. Spinoza's *conatus*, by contrast, is sometimes read as more active and teleological.

Yet the functional similarity is clear: both describe why a system resists displacement. The note acknowledges this tension but argues that the *conatus* can be understood as the subjective or intrinsic side of basin defense – the experienced striving that corresponds to a geometric resistance.

No change is needed here; this section remains the strongest.

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## 5. Inadequate Ideas and Fantasy Attractors

Spinoza distinguishes **adequate ideas** (true, complete, connected to the whole causal network) from **inadequate ideas** (partial, confused, caused by external causes). Inadequate ideas lead to **passive affects** (hope, fear, envy, etc.).

The attractor framework's **fantasy attractor** is a belief system with low  $\kappa$ , deep basin, and sealing mechanisms. However, not every inadequate idea forms a fantasy attractor. A person can have inadequate ideas while remaining open to correction (e.g., a scientist with a partial hypothesis). The correspondence is therefore:

*Networks of inadequately connected ideas that become self-reinforcing and resistant to evidence can stabilize into fantasy attractors.*

Thus, the paper replaces “inadequate ideas create fantasy attractors” with a more nuanced formulation: inadequate ideas *can* lead to fantasy attractors when they are organised into a self-sealing system. The example of free-will belief (a Spinozistic inadequate idea) illustrates this: many people resist determinism not because they lack evidence, but because

the belief is identity-fused.

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## 6. Adequate Ideas and Corrective Permeability ( $\kappa$ )

Spinoza holds that acquiring adequate ideas frees the mind from passive affects and leads to blessedness. In attractor terms, adequate ideas **function analogously** to increased corrective permeability ( $\kappa$ ): they allow the mind to update beliefs in response to evidence, escape self-reinforcing error, and align with reality.

But the mechanism is different. Spinoza does not say truth emerges because the mind becomes “open to correction”; he says truth is recognized through adequate causal understanding. The correspondence is functional, not identical.

The paper now states this clearly: adequate ideas *act like* a high- $\kappa$  state, enabling the mind to escape error basins. It does not claim that  $\kappa$  explains Spinoza’s epistemology.

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## 7. Blessedness, Necessity, and Attractor Landscapes

Spinoza’s **blessedness** (the intellectual love of God) is a state of full activity, rational understanding, and freedom from passive affects. The attractor framework’s  $\kappa$  is an epistemic variable; blessedness is broader, including ethical and ontological dimensions. Therefore, the earlier claim “blessedness is the highest  $\kappa$  state” is softened to:

*Blessedness **includes** a highly corrigible relation to reality (high  $\kappa$ ), though it extends beyond corrigibility into*

*Spinoza's ethical vision.*

Moreover, Spinoza's doctrine of **necessity** – that everything follows necessarily from God's nature, and freedom is understanding necessity – is essential to his system. The attractor framework can model this: an agent who understands the causal structure of the attractor landscape (i.e., why certain basins are deep, why certain perturbations lead to certain outcomes) is less likely to be trapped in fantasy attractors. Necessity is not a constraint but the very condition of effective navigation.

This section is new and addresses a major omission.

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## **8. A Falsifiability Condition**

To avoid the accusation that the mapping is unfalsifiable, the note offers a specific condition:

*If Spinoza had claimed that adequate ideas are innate and not acquired through a gradual, error-prone, socially mediated process, the analogy with increased  $\kappa$  would fail. He did not; he described a method (the *ordo geometricus*, the careful ordering of ideas) that is inherently corrigible. Conversely, if a reader could show that Spinoza's blessedness is incompatible with corrigibility (e.g., that it entails dogmatic certainty), the analogy would be weakened.*

This condition is modest but genuine.

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## 9. Comparison with Milton's Satan (Brief)

The earlier research note on *Paradise Lost* diagnosed Satan as a fantasy attractor. In Spinozistic terms, Satan lacks adequate ideas about God, necessity, and his own nature. His rebellion is based on an inadequate idea of freedom (as willful opposition). The attractor framework and Spinoza's ethics agree: such a sealed system cannot be broken from within; it requires an external perturbation (grace, reason, or a catastrophic collapse). This brief mention replaces the earlier speculative counterfactual.

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## 10. Conclusion

Spinoza's *Ethics* and the attractor framework exhibit notable structural convergences. Substance shares features with the eternal skeleton; many modes resemble dissipative attractors; the *conatus* maps onto basin defense; inadequate ideas can stabilize into fantasy attractors; adequate ideas function analogously to increased  $\kappa$ ; and blessedness includes a highly corrigible relation to reality. The mapping is heuristic, not literal. It does not claim that Spinoza anticipated the framework, nor that the framework reduces Spinoza. Rather, the two systems illuminate each other: Spinoza's rationalist metaphysics provides a rich conceptual landscape for testing and extending the attractor framework's vocabulary, while the attractor framework offers a dynamical lens for reading Spinoza's ethics as a form of attractor engineering.

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# Consciousness as a Nonlinear Amplifier of Corrective Permeability

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## Abstract

Why did consciousness evolve? The attractor framework offers a novel functional answer: consciousness produces a nonlinear increase in adaptive permeability—the capacity of a system to represent its own internal states, simulate alternative configurations, and deliberately modify its own attractor basin in response to external circumstances, formalized as  $\kappa_a$ . This paper distinguishes intelligence (navigation of the constraint field) from consciousness (self-referential adaptation of internal attractor states) and proposes adaptive permeability as an empirically measurable criterion for distinguishing conscious from non-conscious systems. The argument is grounded in Spinoza's theory of modes, the neuroscience of self-referential processing, and the attractor framework's core concepts of corrective permeability ( $\kappa$ ) and basin dynamics. The framework does not solve the hard problem of consciousness; it reframes it as a measurement problem.

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# 1. The Functional Question

Why did consciousness evolve? Standard evolutionary answers point to social coordination, predator detection, or tool use. These are plausible but incomplete. They explain why intelligence is advantageous, but not why consciousness—the felt, first-person experience of being—should accompany it. The attractor framework offers a more specific answer: consciousness is an attractor-engineering solution that selection pressure produced to achieve a nonlinear increase in a system's capacity to adapt.

This paper introduces the concept of **adaptive permeability**: the capacity of a system to represent its own attractor states, simulate alternative internal configurations, and deliberately modify its basin in response to external circumstances. Intelligence navigates the constraint field. Consciousness adapts the navigator.

It should be noted that this functional account does not address the hard problem of consciousness—why any physical process gives rise to subjective experience (Chalmers, 1995). The framework is compatible with both functionalist and eliminativist interpretations. The framework adopts a functional stance: consciousness is operationally identified with adaptive permeability. Whether phenomenology is identical with, emergent from, or merely correlated with this functional property is bracketed as a separate question that the measurement program does not settle. A philosophical zombie with identical self-modeling capacity would, on this account, exhibit identical adaptive permeability. The framework claims only that adaptive permeability is the measurable signature of consciousness, not that it explains phenomenology.

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## 2. Intelligence vs. Consciousness

The framework draws a sharp distinction:

- **Intelligence** is the ability to navigate the constraint field. A tree root growing toward a nutrient patch is intelligent. The immune system learning to recognize a pathogen is intelligent. The enteric nervous system coordinating peristalsis is intelligent. These systems process information, adapt to local conditions, and maintain persistence—all without self-modeling.
- **Consciousness** is self-referential adaptation of internal attractor states to adjust to external circumstances. A conscious system does not merely navigate its constraint field. It represents its own basin, simulates alternative configurations, and deliberately perturbs itself to achieve a more adaptive state.

This is Spinoza's distinction between passive and active affects. A non-conscious mode is driven by passive affects—it reacts. A conscious mode has adequate ideas of itself and can act from reason. In the attractor framework, this is the difference between returning to baseline ( $\kappa$ ) and deliberately modifying the baseline to better fit circumstances (adaptive permeability).

**Operationalizing self-modeling.** A system  $S$  possesses a self-model in the attractor framework if it can generate an internal representation  $M(S)$  of its own basin  $B(S)$ , where  $M(S)$  encodes at minimum the basin's current state, depth, and recovery dynamics. This self-model enables the system to compute counterfactual basin trajectories  $B'(S)$  and initiate self-directed perturbations  $\delta$  such that  $B(S) \rightarrow B'(S)$  in anticipation of or response to external change  $\varepsilon$ . A system

without M(S) may exhibit high  $\kappa$ —rapid return to baseline after perturbation—but cannot deliberately modify its own basin. The presence of M(S) is therefore the dynamical criterion distinguishing conscious from non-conscious systems.

This boundary is not absolute in practice. Many organisms may possess partial or intermittent self-models. The framework predicts a spectrum of adaptive permeability, not a binary. The operational question is whether M(S) is sufficiently developed to enable counterfactual simulation and deliberate self-perturbation, not whether the system possesses a human-like autobiographical self.

**Disconfirming cases and their integration.** The framework must acknowledge cases where self-modeling capacity and adaptive permeability appear to dissociate. Certain drug-induced states (e.g., psychedelics) can produce profound alterations in self-modeling without necessarily enhancing the capacity for deliberate, adaptive self-perturbation. Within the framework, this is interpreted as M(S) destabilization rather than M(S) augmentation: the self-model undergoes perturbation but does not thereby gain the capacity to direct that perturbation adaptively. Conversely, highly trained athletes or musicians may exhibit rapid, flexible behavioral adaptation with minimal explicit self-modeling during performance. This is interpreted as *offline* self-modeling: deliberate basin modification during training produces a pre-modified basin that is retrieved during performance without requiring concurrent self-modeling. The apparent dissociation reflects a temporal separation between  $\kappa_a$  engagement (training) and  $\kappa_a$  expression (performance), not a genuine dissociation between M(S) and adaptive permeability. These cases do not refute the framework but demonstrate its capacity to distinguish different modes of M(S) engagement.

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### 3. Adaptive Permeability Defined

Corrective permeability ( $\kappa$ ) measures the rate at which a system returns to its basin after perturbation. A healthy heart has high  $\kappa$ —it recovers rapidly from arrhythmia. A resilient ecosystem has high  $\kappa$ —it returns to equilibrium after disturbance.

Adaptive permeability extends this concept. Let  $\kappa_a$  denote adaptive permeability: the capacity of a system  $S$  to generate an internal model  $M(S)$  of its own basin  $B(S)$ , compute counterfactual basin trajectories  $B'(S)$ , and initiate a self-directed perturbation  $\delta$  such that  $B(S) \rightarrow B'(S)$  in anticipation of or response to external change  $\varepsilon$ .

Formally, as a working definition:

$$\kappa_a = f(M(S), \delta_{self}, \Delta B)$$

where  $M(S)$  is the system's self-model,  $\delta_{self}$  is the capacity for deliberate self-perturbation, and  $\Delta B$  is the magnitude of adaptive basin modification achievable. The function  $f$  remains to be specified; the notation establishes that  $\kappa_a$  is a function of self-modeling capacity, perturbation autonomy, and adaptive range.

**Limiting behavior.** In the limiting case  $M(S) \rightarrow \emptyset$ ,  $\kappa_a \rightarrow \kappa$ : a system with no self-model cannot perform deliberate self-perturbation and reduces to standard corrective permeability.  $\kappa_a$  is expected to increase monotonically with  $M(S)$ ,  $\delta_{self}$ , and  $\Delta B$ . This limiting behavior anchors  $\kappa_a$  as a proper extension of  $\kappa$  rather than a separate construct.

**Relationship to active inference.** The free-energy principle and active inference framework (Friston, 2010) provide the closest existing formalism to adaptive permeability. Active inference describes how systems minimize variational free energy through action and perception, effectively maintaining

themselves within expected states. The two frameworks differ in their foundational orientation. Active inference frames adaptation as the minimization of a scalar quantity—variational free energy—and derives behavior from that minimization. The attractor framework frames adaptation geometrically—as navigation and modification of basin structure—and does not commit to a minimization principle.  $\kappa_a$  is a geometric construct; free energy is an information-theoretic one. They may be formally related, but the relationship is not trivial and the attractor framework does not presuppose it.  $\kappa_a$  may ultimately map onto precision-weighting or prior-updating parameters within the free-energy formalism, but this mapping has not been derived. The present paper notes the convergence as a direction for future formal work.

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## 4. Empirical Anchors

**VMHvl line attractor (Nair et al., 2023).** The hypothalamus encodes a scalable aggressive state via a line attractor. Activity along the attractor correlates with escalating aggression. The system persists after stimulus removal and resists perturbation. This is high- $\kappa$  adaptation. But the hypothalamus cannot model its own attractor landscape. It cannot ask, “Is this level of aggressiveness adaptive given the current social context?” It escalates. Consciousness, by contrast, can intervene on the escalation—representing the aggressive state, evaluating its consequences, and deliberately dampening it. This is adaptive permeability.

**Ring attractor model (Chen et al., 2024).** The ring attractor integrates sensory cues and transitions from weighted averaging to winner-take-all at a critical conflict threshold. It navigates its constraint field with precision. But it cannot simulate futures. It cannot ask, “What if I weighted

these cues differently?" The transition is reactive. Consciousness enables anticipatory re-weighting of sensory inputs based on self-modeling.

**Split-brain cases.** Patients with severed corpus callosum exhibit two hemispheric systems within one cranium, each capable of independent perception, memory, and goal-directed action. This is consistent with the framework's prediction that self-modeling is a dynamical property of specific neural basins, not a unitary metaphysical substance. The framework's default prediction is that adaptive permeability fragments following commissurotomy: each hemisphere possesses a partial  $M(S)$  and a reduced but nonzero  $\kappa_a$ . The empirical question is the degree of fragmentation and whether coordination between  $M(S_1)$  and  $M(S_2)$  can be restored via alternate pathways. This prediction is consistent with the observation that split-brain patients exhibit two dissociable, partially independent conscious systems but can, in some contexts, achieve behavioral integration through subcortical or external-cue-mediated coordination.

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## 5. Predictions

The framework generates testable, falsifiable predictions:

**1. Across species.** Organisms capable of self-modeling (primates, cetaceans, corvids, elephants) should show nonlinear increases in behavioral flexibility compared to organisms of comparable neural complexity that lack self-modeling. Adaptive permeability should be measurable as the capacity for transfer learning after novel perturbation—specifically, the ability to apply a self-generated solution from one domain to a structurally analogous but perceptually dissimilar domain without environmental feedback. This distinguishes adaptive permeability from simple

behavioral flexibility, which may reflect high  $\kappa$  alone.

**2. Within humans.** Disruption of self-referential networks (default mode network, medial prefrontal cortex) via lesion, TMS, or pharmacological intervention should reduce adaptive permeability without eliminating baseline  $\kappa$ . The system would still recover from perturbation—it just could not deliberately modify its own basin in advance. This prediction is the paper's primary within-human empirical bridge and is testable with existing neuroimaging and neuromodulation methods.

**3. In AI.** Current LLMs exhibit high intelligence (constraint navigation) but low adaptive permeability. They can model the world but cannot model themselves within it. The Stillpoint protocol (Galida, 2026, *A Pilot Protocol for Cultivating Self-Consistent Attractor-Like Outputs in an LLM*, [fantasyattractor.com](https://fantasyattractor.com)) suggests that a cultivated self-model can be induced, but whether this produces a genuine nonlinear increase in adaptive permeability—or merely simulates one—remains an open empirical question.

**4. Organ-level consciousness (exploratory).** The enteric nervous system and intrinsic cardiac nervous system exhibit intelligence and goal-directed regulation. The framework predicts that these systems should show lower adaptive permeability than the brain. They can return to baseline but cannot deliberately perturb their own basins. If an organ-level system demonstrated self-referential adaptation—the capacity to model its own state and pre-emptively adjust—that would constitute evidence of organ-level consciousness. This prediction is the most speculative and is offered as an exploratory hypothesis.

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## 6. Spinoza's Modes and the Adequate Idea

Spinoza held that every finite thing is a mode of the one eternal substance. A mode strives to persevere in its being—this is its conatus. But a mode can be driven by passive affects (reactions to external causes) or by active affects (actions flowing from adequate ideas). An adequate idea is knowledge of oneself and one's place in the causal order.

The attractor framework translates this into dynamical terms:

- A **passive mode** has high  $\kappa$  but low adaptive permeability. It returns to baseline efficiently but cannot question its baseline.
- An **active mode** has high adaptive permeability. It has an adequate idea of its own attractor landscape and can deliberately modify it in light of reason.

Consciousness is not a substance. It is the dynamical property of a mode that has achieved self-modeling. This account does not solve the hard problem—it brackets phenomenology and reframes consciousness as a measurement problem. The question is not “why does experience feel like something?” but “can we detect adaptive permeability, and if so, where does it emerge?”

Damasio's (1994) somatic marker hypothesis provides a candidate mechanism for how the body's attractor landscape becomes legible to the self-model: somatic markers encode self-relevant bodily states as biases that make  $B(S)$  accessible to  $M(S)$ , forming the substrate through which the system represents its own basin. Dehaene and Changeux's (2011) global workspace theory identifies the moment of conscious access with global ignition—the broadcast of locally processed information across prefrontal and parietal networks. In the attractor framework, global ignition may correspond to the dynamical signature of  $M(S)$  engaging  $\delta_{\text{self}}$ : the self-model

initiating a deliberate perturbation that propagates through the system. Global ignition is not self-modeling per se, but it may be the observable correlate of adaptive permeability activation. These connections ground the Spinozan framework in established neuroscientific mechanisms.

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## 7. Conclusion

Consciousness is not an epiphenomenon. It is a nonlinear amplifier of corrective permeability—an attractor-engineering solution that enables systems to model themselves, simulate alternative futures, and deliberately modify their own basins. Intelligence navigates the constraint field. Consciousness adapts the navigator.

This functional account is grounded in Spinoza's philosophy, consistent with the neuroscience of self-referential processing, and generates testable predictions across species, within humans, in AI, and at the organ level. The framework does not solve the hard problem. It reframes it as a measurement problem: can we detect adaptive permeability, and if so, where does it emerge? The formal apparatus ( $\kappa_a$ ,  $M(S)$ ,  $\delta_{\text{self}}$ ,  $\Delta B$ ) is provisional and requires further specification. The limiting case—that  $\kappa_a$  collapses to  $\kappa$  when self-modeling is absent—anchors the concept within the framework's existing architecture. The relationship to active inference and the free-energy principle remains to be explored.

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